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Government Movee Cautiously
The Conservative government of John Diefenbaker decried the British
deciaion to open negotiations with the Community. Diefenbakerts appeal .
to Comrnonwealth ties was etrongly emotional and evoked a favorable
response among Canadiane. Relatively little was said by the Prime
Minieter about the economic consequences of an expanded Community,
though it was pointed out by aome that Ganada not only had little to lose
if Commonwealth preferences were abolished, but, in fact, etood to gain
a etrong foothold in the European market.
Economic conditione in Canada during 1962 were recessive. The increase
in the GNP wae juet barely keeping ahead of population growth. Bueinese
leadere were reluctant to trade the apparent certainties of Gommonwealth
preference for a new relationahip with an enlarged.European Community.
Both governnlent and bueineee breathed a eigh of relief when the negotia-
tions were suepended in January 1963. Bueiness was s.Pared large-scale
adjustments at a time when the economy was beginning to pull out of the
alump. For the government, it meant the vindication of ite policy of
opposition to Britainr s joining the Community, and ample time to PrePare
itself in case the queetion arose again.
The Liberal party, then in oppoaition, deplored the evente of January 1963.
When the Liberals, led by Leeter Peareon, took the reigne of government
three montha later, observers looked for a marked reversal in Canadian
econornic policy. Businees leaders feared that the Liberale, traditionally
free-tradera, would offer substantial concesaione during the Kennedy
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CANADIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
Following are some views of one observer from the Washington office
after aeveral daye in Canada recently talking with government officiale,
members of the preBs, private research groupo, and business leaders.
Conflicting attitudes formed during the Communityre negotiations with
the United Kingdom pereiet in Canada today. A considerable difference
of opinion exi.eta between the government and the private Bector. Cana-
dian policy in the Kennedy Round and Ganadare place in the Atlantic
partnership are due, in large meaBure, to the events of JanuaryL963,
current bueinees conditions, and the present domeetic political sihration.
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Round without coneidering the economic conoequenceE. Peareon quickly
diepelled theee fears by announcing that the government would be willing
to accord concegsions only on the bagia of complete reciprocity.
In the last year, Canada hae been playing a somewhat unique role in the
Kennedy Round negotiations. It has been unable to agree to a linear cut
in its tariff e for two reasons: first, the preponderance of its exports are
in the agricultural gector and conseguently would not benefit from linear
tariff cute; and second, the greatest part of its trade is with the United
Statee. The U.S., not Ganada, would benefit substantially if the linear
rule were applied. Other members of GATT have accepted the need for
Canada to be given a epecial position in the negotiations, though not with-
out some reticence. Canadian tariff negotiators are acutely aware that
Canadars maneuverability in the Kennedy Round is limited by the epecial
status given it. For tJ:ie reason and perhaps because of a feeling of
isolation, these negotiators and officials in the Departmente of External
Affaire and Commerce and Trade are reluctant to let themselvee become
overly optimistic about the Kennedy Round.
The Canadian government is not forced to take a strong stand on the level
of the linear cut, disparitiee, the exceptions lists, or even on agriculture.
The first two are of }ittle importance to a country that ie iteelf exempted
from the linear cut rule and which is pledged to getting complete reclpro-
city for all conceseions. The fact that exceptions lists may be short or
long does not concern Canada, which will be submitting a negotiating liet
not an exceptions list. In the agricultural sector, the chief Canadian
farm export to the Gommunity is hard wheat which will be largely un-
affected by the Common Agricultural Policy. Even if a relatively high
common grain price is adopted by the EEC, Canadian exporters do not
expect that their markete will be seriously affected.
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Businese Turns the Gorner
If the government ie warily optimietic about the Kennedy Round, business
is more openly in favor of its BucceEs. The main cause of thie oPtimiBm
(which even renewed EEC-United Kingdom negotiations would probably
not diminish) is the continuing economic upswing. Once again, the buei-
nesa picture rnay be strongly influenced by economic developments south
of the border.
Bueiness leadere attribute much of their optimism to their discovery that
the Community haa encountered difficultiea and even economic getbacks.
Paradoxically for thie reason, they look more favorably on long-terrn
trade relations with the Gornrnunity.
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A significant part of Canadian exports are accounted for by the pulp and
paper industry. Induetry leaders are still displeased by the common
external tariff provieions on pulp and newsprint, but they forecast that a
rapidly growing European demand will mean increased shipmentg even
if pulp and paper are on the EEc exceptions list. They would, however,
regard such a move by the EEG as a clear sign of protectionism.
The business community has a confidence in the Liberal government that
it did not feel for the Conservatives. Surprisingly, they find the Liberals
more hard-headed and less prone to base their policies on emotional
appeals to certain groups of the voting population. Most of the doubts
about Liberal free-trade policy have been overcome by repeated govern-
ment assertions that it wiII insist on the rule of reciprocity.
The Quebecois, standing apart from the rest of the industr.ial East, dis-
play lese interest in the economic prospects of trading with the EEC
even though their own efforts have done much to strengthen the overall
position of Canadian business. Quebec is now undergoing a major
economic renaissance resulting not from Quebec nationalism but from
the realization that the inward-looking Quebec society had kept the
province from enjoying many of the benefits of the industrial revolution.
In a single rnighty effort, Quebec is expanding existing enterprises,
entering new areas of endeavor, and sending new people into the top
levels of rnanagement. ltrhile this effort ie directed exclusively at the
rapid economic betterment of Qlrebec, it is eerving as a etimulus to
business throughout the eastern part of the country.
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Britain Enters the Cornrnunity
Both government and businese officials are now willing to discuse the
problems that would face Canada if the British application for membership
in the Community were again under active consideration. All realize that
this is not likely to happen in the near future. For thia reasonr perhaps,
the government has not been ehrdying the policies that rnight be adopted
under such circumstances. It is not making use of the breathing space it
acquired in January L963. Instead, the Liberals are preoccuPied with
dorneetic probleme which must be settled before the end ot L964.
Most observers agree that British entry into the Community world isolate
Canada economically. An expanded Cornmunity would mean the end of a
rneaningful Cornmonwealth and the erection of a common external tariff
around ae many as thirteen European countriee. It would probably mean
that the United States would move to establish an extensive new trading
relationships with the new Europe. In this regard, Canadians are quick
to point out that it was the 80 per cent rule of the Trade Expansion Act
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which caused them the most concern mainly because they were not
eligible to take part in those reductions.
Canadare leaders would probably not resist the British entry but would
seek a stronger and somewhat more formal trade relationship with the
United States. Most interest focuse6 on a North American free trade
area. Knowledgeable Canadians recognize that the main opposition to
such a proposal will be found in the U.S. Coryress. Yet they believe
that considerable trade advantages from a free trade atea would accrue
to the United Statee. If the current automobile parts trade policy is
succeesful, Canadians will coneider it a favorable omen for rrrore €x-
tensive arrangements. Under the automobile parts plan, Canadian
manufachrrers would be able to specialize in the production of certain
parts of automobile models for all of North America in return for which
the Canadian market would be completely opened to U. S. automobile
exports. This product seerrra the best suited for such an arrangement
since almost all Canadian autornobile production is Arnerican-owned.
Research groups such as the Canadian-American Committee (formed by
the Private Planning Association of Canada and the American National
Planning Association) are undertaking long-range studies of the free
trade area and other proposals. Many observers believe that even if
the automobile parts arrangement is not acceptable to the U.S. Congress,
the free trade area proposal would have to be supported by Canada if
Britain entered the European Community.
Canadars
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Ijgtr i, tE World
Canada is currently struggling to find a national identity. The debate on
the national flag -- whether the British ensign should be replaced by a
distinctively Canadian maple leaf design -- is a tangible indication of
this struggle.
The controversy is, of course, stimulated by the differences between
the French-speaking population and th'e descendents of the British colon-
ialists. Canadians of French origin still have strong feelings about what
they call the English rrconquest. rr Opportunities in government and
business continue to be denied them because they are not fluent in English.
Yet this doee not mean that one part of the country has a pro-French policy
and the other a pro-British policy.
The French-speaking Canadians have an ambivalent attitude toward France.
On the one hand, they are proud to share the same culture and tradition as
the French. For thie reason, they understand the appeal of General De
GaullerB quest fortrgrandeur.'r On the other hand, French Canadians have
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become increaeingly oriented toward North American culture and many
feel uncomfortable when they visit France, much to their own surpriee.
Canadiane of Britieh origin sense almoet no real ties with Great Britain.
In addition, some, tired of nationaliem, are willing to consider seriously
the union of Canada (or large parts of it) with the United States. These
CanadianB are gradually coming to the conclusion that Canada can have
no unique national identity. There is, however, a sizeable percentage,
of a non-French, non-Britieh European origin, which remains loyal to
Britain in her role as head of the Commonwealth. The most vocal spokes-
man of thia group is John Diefenbaker.
The national identity Canada has been seeking may arise not from its
ethnic make-up but from its position as one of the strongest and largest
of the middle powers. Canada seeks to mediate. Its role in numerous
United Nations peace-keeping forces is an outgrowth of this policy and is
directly linked to Prime Minister Pearson, who won a Nobel Peace Prize
for his U. N. activities. In addition, because it embodies elements of
both culhrres, Canada has traditionally claimed the right to mediate be-
tween Europe and the United States.
Many Canadians seem to be tiring of the mediatorrs ro1e. tr'irst, they do
not believe that mediation can be very effective since Canada is clearly
not a neutralist power but is firmly on the side of the l,[est. Second,
U. N. activitiee mean the commitment of Canadian troops to war zoneB,
which will probably be increasingly difficult to juetify as the U.N. enters
additional trouble spots. Third, the tradition of mediation between Europe
and the United States seems to have lapsed because of the growing ties
between the North Arnerican neighbors. Only Eome French Canadians,
seeking to justify tJreir leanings toward a Gaullist policy, still claim that
this role is important.
One recent case indicates the extent to which domestic Canadian politics
affect the mediator role. Canada has not been pressed by the United
States to take part in the multilateral force nor has it sought to mediate
between the French and the American positions on the MlF-European
nuclear force question. Neither major poLitical party wishes to raise
the question before the Canadian electorate because in a period of sharp
domestic controversy they are unable to gauge public reaction to any
policy concerned with nuclear weapons. Thus Canada has kept silent.
Canada seeke diversity in the Atlantic area for it does not want to be
swallowed up by American policies while in the procese of discovering
a national identity. Yet there is greater awareness that European unity
will mean either closer alignment with the United States or ieolation in
the Atlantic area. Canada is ready to construct new ties with the United
States but would regret losing the power to pursue an indenpendent
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cour6e -- PerhaPB such as in trading with Communist bloc countries.
***
The Community and Canadian Information Media
Most of the press and the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation are eager
for more Gommunity news and information. Until the present, they have
relied largely on indirect sourcee of information. Increasingly they are
receiving information through the Washington office of the Communities
and have indicated a willingness to make use of it. Much of the Canadian
public is not ready, however, to follow day-to-day Comrnunity develop-
ments cloeeIy. There are signs of a growing interest in the bueineee
community and in such parts of the government as the Departments of
External Affaire and Commerce and Trade, and the Bank of Canada in
more detailed and timely information on the Community.
Part of this growing need can be met by the services of the Waehington
and New York offices of the Communities. The member of the EEC
official spokesmanrs group concerned with North American affairs can
help ensure that certain material of special interest to Canadians is
channeled to them quickly. Visitors frorn the Communities to the United
States can increasingly add Canadian stops to their itineraries.
In 1967, Montreal will play host to an officially-sanctioned Vforldrs Fair
where over 30 million visitors are expected. The Cornmunity should
consider participation in this fair especially if other international
otganizations and the member statee participate, as they did in Brussels
in 1958. 1957 also seems the appropriate year for the establishment of a
Community office in Canada. The most desirable location would be in
Montreal, Canadars largest city, center of French and English culture,
and one of the two most important business centers. The establishment
of such an office would rneet a growing need and indicate to Canada that
the Comrnunity, as well as the United States, has a vital interest in
establishing closer relationships with it.
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